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Abstract—Hardware Trojans (HT) inserted in integrated cir-
cuits have received special attention of researchers. In this paper,
we present firstly a novel HT detection technique based on path
delays measurements. A delay model, which considers intra-die
process variations, is established for a net. Secondly, we show
how to detect HT using ElectroMagnetic (EM) measurements.
We study the HT detection probability according to its size taking
into account the inter-die process variations with a set of FPGA.
The results show, for instance, that there is a probability greater
than 95% with a false negative rate of 5% to detect a HT larger
than 1.7% of the original circuit.
I. Introduction
The trust and security of Integrated Circuits (IC) design and
fabrication is critical for sensitive fields like finance, health,
and governmental communications. Due to the complexity and
the high cost of IC fabrication cycle, more and more firms
outsource their production. This trend gives a possibility for
an adversary to introduce malicious circuit, called Hardware
Trojan horse (HT), in any IC. It can either perform a Denial
Of Service (DOS), deteriorate circuit performance [8], or steal
sensitive information. Therefore, the HTs are considered a real
threat which has gained attention from researchers.
HT can be inserted at any point during the design or
fabrication process from Register Transfer Level (RTL) to
layout and circuit fabrication. For example in [11], authors
show some techniques to insert malicious circuitry at RTL
level. These HTs, which are activated with a specific pattern
inputs, can leak secret key via RS232 channels. The HT, unlike
a software trojan, cannot be removed once it is fabricated. So,
it is better to proactively prevent the insertion of a HT: few
methods have been proposed. One seminal work is known
as “private circuits II” [9]. This paper describes a proof-of-
concept, too costly to be implemented. A more reasonable
option has been recently proposed in [5]: it uses two codes
to encode the state and mix it with encoded randomness,
which allows to prevent an easy triggering and has a detection
capability.
Otherwise it is important to detect it before it becomes effec-
tive. Previous works classify detection methods into two wide
categories: destructive and non-destructive. Invasive methods
destroy the chip to reconstruct successfully the GDSII and
the netlist of the chip using chemical products and optical
observation apparati as Scanning Optical Microscopy (SOM),
Scanning Electron Microscopy (SEM), etc. The main advan-
tage of such invasive technique is its accuracy for all malicious
insertions. However, the destructive nature and lengthy time
needed to reconstruct the netlist of the chip are two significant
drawbacks.
Non-destructive methods compare the physical character-
istics or logical state of an IC with a genuine circuit also
known as the “golden circuit” at testing time or run-time.
An optical detection of changes in the last metal layer of
metallization has been proposed in [4]. In [1], authors pro-
pose to add re-configurable DEsign-For-ENabling-SEcurity
(DEFENSE) logic to the functional design. In test time, the
first approach is using logic testing. It involves applying test
patterns at the input and try to detect anomalous behaviors
of ICs [3], [10]. But almost all test-time detection techniques
are difficult to realize. They cannot ensure that HT will be
activated because of the complexity of test patterns. Therefore,
Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) can also be deployed to detect
HTs. These methods observe and compare physical traits
(power consumption, time delay, etc.) of an IC under test
against a trusted IC [15], [16].
A promising approach for detecting HTs is to study delay
measurements, because the HT does not need to be triggered
and its mere presence can impact a part of the IC path delays.
In [12], [18], path delays are used as a fingerprint for a trusted
IC (Golden Model, or GM). The first purpose of our paper is to
show how HTs can be detected despite having small size and
being not logically connected with elements of critical data
paths. A significant advantage of this method is the detection
of IC alterations without activating the payload of the HT and
by using a low cost mean. The importance of not only limiting
the study to critical paths is shown. Moreover, the intra-die
process variations are considered in these analyses.
On the other side, previous works on SCA-based detection
have been limited to either simulations or power consumption
measurements on some real circuit. In [13], authors present
a practical evaluation of HT detection using SCA on FPGA.
But the experiments were performed on a single FPGA so the
inter-die process variations were not taken into account. In
our paper, we also study the HT detection method based on
ElectroMagnetic (EM) measurements which provide a better
spatial and temporal resolution than power measurements
hence improving HT detection result. Moreover, we propose
a metric to evaluate the impact of inter-die process variations
in HT detection based on EM measurements according to HT
size. Process variations are studied on 8 different Virtex 5
FPGA boards.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
scribes the structure of created HTs and how they are inserted
at layout level in FPGA. Section III presents the HT detection
using delay analysis approach. Section IV shows the results of
HT detection based on ElectroMagnetic (EM) measurements.
Section V studies the impact of inter-die process variations on
HT detection based on SCA. We finish with a small conclusion
and some perspectives in section VI.
II. Hardware Trojan Insertion
A. Hardware Trojan Insertion Methodology
Our attack scenario is the following: attacker is an untrusted
ASIC foundry. Upon reception of the tape-out database (GDS
file), the founder inserts a HT before fabrication. In order to
reduce the impact of HT on the genuine circuit, the HT must be
inserted keeping the original placement and routing of target
circuit. To imitate the HT insertion on ASICs, we need to keep
the same placement and routing between the golden circuit
and HT infected circuit on FPGAs. Hence the only difference
between the two is the logic and the interconnect utilized by
the HT. To insert a HT, without modifying the routing, we
apply the following steps in the Xilinx framework:
1) Synthesize, translate, map, place & route the original
circuit. In our case, it is an AES-128 block cipher.
2) Extract the Native Circuit Description (NCD) file which
contain all the circuit, placement & routing information
of original circuit (this is the golden model).
3) Open the NCD file using FPGA Editor tool and insert
HT in unused LUTs and Slices of FPGA, manually or
by a script.
4) Generate bit files for both original and infected circuits
with FPGA Editor.
With this method, we can ensure that the placement and
routing is the same in both golden and HT-infected circuit.
It allows us to perform the proof-of-concept of HT attack at
ASIC layout level (the FPGA fabric is seen as an ASIC).
B. Hardware Trojan Description
A HT is distinguished by its spread into the IC, its size
and its behavior. For testing our method in different contexts,
two types of HT were implemented: a combinational and a
sequential one.
The trigger part of the combinational HT scans 32 SubBytes
signals at the input of the SubBytes step. The trigger is
activated when simultaneous occurrences at ‘1’ of all the 32
SubBytes bits occur. Its payload consists in causing a DOS.
This HT uses 0.19% of slices in the FPGA, whereas AES
implementation covers 38.26% of the FPGA slices.
The sequential HT includes a 32-bit counter with a compara-
tor which is incremented for each AES encryption. The HT
becomes active when the counter is equal to a defined value.
As for the combinational HT, the activation of the sequential
HT involves a deny of service. For this HT, 0.36% of slices
used in the FPGA were required.
In both cases, during our experiments, the two HTs were
not activated. Indeed, we focus on detecting their presence
into the FPGA before the payload is triggered. In addition,
we insist that none of the two HT are on the critical path.
III. HT Detection Using Delay Analysis
A. Approach
Most digital ICs work according to the principle of syn-
chronicity: they use a common clock signal to synchronize
their internal operations. When a datum leaves a register bank
on a clock rising edge, it progresses through the combinational
logic, and goes into the next register bank to be sampled on
the next clock rising edge. This is depicted in Fig. 1, where
the square boxes represent registers and the cloud represents
the combinational logic.
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Figure 1. Internal architecture and timing of synchronous ICs
The clock period Tclk has to respect timing constraints, in
particular a setup condition represented by equation (1):
Tclk > Dclk2q + DpMax + Tsetup − Tskew + T jitter . (1)
This ensures the datum is correctly stored in the register
bank. This equation is related to the delay between the clock
rising edge and the current update of a register’s output Dclk2q,
the value DpMax of the maximum propagation time through
the combinational logic. The Tsetup associated to the set-up
time which is the amount of time for which a D Flip-Flop
input (DFF) must be stable before the clock’s rising edge to
ensure reliable operation. The Tskew represents the skew or
slight phase difference that may exist between the clock signals
at the inputs of two different registers and T jitter is the clock
jitter. A hold time Thold expresses an equivalent constraint as
the Tsetup, but after the clock edge.
Chakraborty et al. implemented a key-enabling additional
mode of operation [7] using logic testing and Abramovici et al.
used a different approach with the design of a re-configurable
platform [1] to inspect the system of a analog chip. In this
paper, the proposed method did not call for an additional
circuitry. Thus, there is no supplementary cost during the
manufactured step, and it remains easy and economical to
realize. The only constraint is the access to the clock.
Our approach is based on a clock glitch, aiming at turning
the comparison into an equality in Eqn. (1). The clock period is
reduced gradually until the last signal transition of the datum
becomes too close to the clock’s rising edge. This triggers
a set-up time violation which leads the DFF’s output into a
meta-stable state. In this way, the clock glitch establishes a
good means to induce path delay violation in ICs [2].
Figure 2. Principle of path measurement, for a given pair (P,K)
Our hypothesis is the following: the addition of HT in
a design can have impact on the internal signals. Figure 2
illustrates the experimental procedure. Delays of α, β and γ
are measured using an iterative decrease of the clock period
(with a 35 ps step). These delays are performed with a GM
as a reference and then with IC under test. The insertion of
a HT will shift the timings, as circled in red in Fig. 2. The
comparison of the critical path between the GM and the circuit
returning from fabrication allows to detect a purported HT.
In Fig. 2, the critical path is net β. Although the HT might
not have modified the structure of this path, this path will
be influenced (through the power-ground network) by the HT
triggering logic, and thus will be slightly different. Of course,
if the HT has gates inserted in the path β, then its length will
be significantly longer.
B. Model and Results on One Chip
Our experiments were made with three different implemen-
tations of the AES: one clean and two infected with a HT.
From these implementations, we generate three bit files which
are inserted one after the other into the FPGA. We inject our
clock glitch on the 10th round of the AES. Thus, we obtained
directly the faulted ciphertext. The experiment was repeated
10 times to lower measurement noise, for each 10, 000 random
pairs {plaintext, key} for all three bit files. Internal signal
waveforms depend on the data processed, thus the critical path
varies when (P,K) varies. Therefore, a matrix is generated to
record the delay for all values of the detected AES bits. A
total of 51 decrease steps of 35 ps were performed.
From our data measurements, we extract the critical path of
AES bits, estimated by the number decrements by clock steps
needed to fault each considered bit.
In [14], the delay model is refined as the sum of a static
part (dS ) and a random process variation part (dR). In our
study, we define the delay DGM of a net Na of the GM by
Eq. (2), where dPV is the arbitrary delay induced by the intra-
die process variations and dMr is the random metastability,
environmental and factor noises (noted r):
DGM(Na, r1) = dS a + dPVa + dMr1 . (2)
We assume that adding a HT in a device changes at least
the delay of one net. If the HT is close to a net Na (or directly
connected to a net Na), dHTa is defined as the random delay
added by the HT to the net Na in an infected IC. Thus, the
delay equation for the net Na is:
DHT (Na, r2) = dS a + dPVa + dMr2 + dHTa . (3)
To deal with sources of uncertainty represented by dMr ,
we performed our experiments 10 times with the GM bit
files. ∆DGM
10
(Na) is the mean delay for the delay differences
∆DGM(Na, r) of all 10 experiments performed on the same
board for different experimental conditions.
Compared to the GM, the infected IC has a different layout.
Thus, if there is a HT, the delay difference ∆D(Na, r) is
described in Eqn. (4):
∆D(Na, r) = |∆D
10
(Na) − DHT (Na, r)| = |∆dMr − dHTb | . (4)
We determine the difference |∆D
10
(Na)−D(Na)|, for different
bit files with and without HT. As illustrated on Fig. 3, for
the sake of clarity, four differences were plotted: two for an
uninfected AES in light green (Clean1 and Clean2) and two
for each HT in dark red (HTcomb and HTseq).
The results are illustrated for two representative pairs (P,K),
namely no13 and 47. The trend is the same for all 50 tested
pairs (P,K). This technique detects the two implemented HTs.
The X-axis is the bit number (in range ~1, 128) and the Y-axis
is the delay difference calculated (refer to Eqn. (4)).
63 71 74 104
0
175
350
525
700
825
1050
1225
1400
Bit number
D
el
ay
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 (in
 ps
)
 
 
HT
comb
HT
seq
Clean1
Clean2
63 71 74 104
0
175
350
525
700
825
1050
1225
1400
Bit number
D
el
ay
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 (in
 ps
)
 
 
HT
comb
HT
seq
Clean1
Clean2
Figure 3. Impact of two HTs on delays, for (P,K) no13 (up) and no47 (down)
One can highlight on the importance to study not only the
critical path but all the data path delays. Each implemented
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Figure 4. EM measurement of a single AES-128 encryption
wire can be considered as a HT sensor. Even if no logical con-
nection exists between the design and the HT, both share the
same power grid inside the FPGA. These electric connections
make the HT detection easier.
Besides, as the data path depends on the data processed,
it is relevant to use several (P,K) pairs, to detect different
sets of bits. Each one brings information. As illustrated on
Fig. 3, the more (P,K) pairs are studied, the more bits will be
sampled, the more evidence about HT presence is collected.
Furthermore, the false positive rate is decreased.
C. First Conclusion
In this first part, we have shown that delays are affected,
sometimes by as much as 1 ns, if a HT is inserted. This
method requires an access to the internal clock of the design.
In cases where the internal clock access cannot be reachable,
Side Channels Analysis can be another solution to detect HTs.
An EM measurement approach is described in Sec. IV.
IV. HT Detection Using Electromagnetic Measurement
In this section, we present the result of HT detection
by EM measurement. The genuine AES and the infected
AES with combinational HT presented in II-B are used to
evaluate this method. These two designs are implemented on
FPGA Virtex 5 (LX30). The experiment is performed using
the setup described in Appendix B. The circuit is clocked
with a frequency of 24 MHz. EM traces are acquired for
random plaintexts, where each trace is averaged 1000 times
by oscilloscope to minimize the measurement noise. A single
EM trace is shown in Fig. 4. We noticed that the SNR seems
good thanks to averaging done by oscilloscope. All the ten
rounds of encryption can be distinctively seen in this trace.
The figure 5 shows 3 traces (two traces for the genuine AES
design and one traces for infected AES with combinational HT
design) for the same plaintext. The traces in black and blue
are for genuine AES design taken at different moments with
the same plaintext. That means we implement genuine AES
design on the FPGA Virtex5, we acquire the first trace with
plaintext P1. Then we turn off the setup, after we re-implement
genuine AES on the same FPGA and we acquire the second
trace with the same plaintext P1. It allow us to evaluate the
measurement noise created by setup installation. Regarding
Fig. 5, these two traces are nearly the same by averaging 1, 000
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Figure 5. Hardware trojan detection using averaged EM traces
times with oscilloscope. Therefore setup noise is removed. The
third trace is the one of infected AES design which is acquired
with the same plaintext P1 as the two genuine AES traces.
We noticed that the trace of infected AES (in red) is different
comparing with the genuine AES traces at some samples. This
difference comes from HT insertion. Therefore, the HT can be
easily detected by comparing directly the genuine AES traces
and infected AES traces with the same plaintext. Notice that
the plaintext is fixed but unknown and that the HT is never
activated during the experiments.
V. Impact of Inter-Die Process Variations on HT Detection
In the previous sections III and IV, HT insertion can be
easily detected by using delay/EM analyses. But in these
experiments, the genuine and infected circuits are programmed
in the same FPGA. Therefore it is logical that the difference
of delay or EM measurement between these two designs is
visible which makes the detection of the inserted HT easy. In
a real scenario, genuine and infected circuits are two distinct
physical circuits. In this case, the comparison of delay or
EM measurement between genuine and infected design is
more difficult because of inter-die Process Variations (PV).
Indeed two circuits fabricated with the same process, and in
the same wafer, have slightly different physical and electrical
behaviors. Therefore the result of HT detection using Side-
Channel Analysis varies. In this section, we study the impact
of PV on the HT detection method using EM measurement.
More precisely, we want to evaluate the probability of HT
detection according to its size taking into account the process
variations of 65 nm technology.
A. HT Detection Feasibility with Inter-Die Process Variations
In order to evaluate the process variation noise, a set of 8
FPGA Virtex 5 LX30 with the technology of 65 nm are used.
The EM detection method is performed in these FPGA. Using
the test board FF324 Virtex 5 described in Appendix B, we
can easily change the test FPGA while keeping other setup
parts (probe position, board test, etc) intact. It ensures that we
evaluate only the impact of process variations.
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Figure 6. Impact of Process Variations on EM measurements
In order to evaluate the impact of HT size on the HT
detection probability, we implemented 3 varieties of combi-
national HT described in Sec. II-B on the Virtex 5 FPGA.
The description of these 3 different varieties is the following:
• HT 1: is activated when 25 = 32 SubBytes input signals
are at ‘1’. It occupies 0.5% of original AES.
• HT 2: is activated when 26 = 64 SubBytes input signals
are at ‘1’. It occupies 1.0% of original AES.
• HT 3: is activated when 27 = 128 SubBytes input signals
are at ‘1’. It occupies 1.7% of original AES.
In total, four different designs (genuine AES, infected AES
with HT 1, HT 2 and HT 3) are implemented on 8 FPGA
Virtex 5. For each implementation we acquired one trace
(averaged 1, 000 times) for the same plaintext. So finally, we
acquired 32 mean traces for both genuine and infected AES.
In Fig. 6 we plotted the difference Dg j = |G j − E
8
(G)| of
all golden circuit inserted in 8 FPGA in green, and Dts, j =
|Ts, j − E
8
(G)| of all HT s infected circuit in red. Our notations
are defined below:
• G j is the EM trace of jth ( j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 8}) golden circuit,
• Ts, j is the EM trace of jth HT s (s ∈ {1, 2, 3}) infected
circuit, and
• E
8
(G) is the EM trace mean over all 8 golden circuits.
We can notice the static differences between green (or gray)
curves that are due to process variations. We also notice that
the difference of EM measurement in red (or black) for AES
with HT 2 (1%) is bigger than the fluctuation of process
variations for certain samples thus allow the possibility to
detect this HT. This clearly shows that the insertion of HT
is detectable if we choose specific points of interest.
B. False Negative Rate of HT Detection
As mentioned before, the reference to build a SCA detection
method is mainly biased by process variations (PV), thus dete-
riorating HT detection efficiency. The process variation effect
is modeled by a random noise with a Gaussian distribution [6].
In particular, some FPGAs will emit more and some less. The
impact of the HT is a deterministic shift of the EM emanations,
with more or less impact on different fabricated ICs. Therefore
the HT contribution to the side-channel (e.g., the EM field) can
be modeled by an activity offset on a net used by the HT. This
is illustrated on figure 7.
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Figure 7. EM field probability density functions for a genuine and an infected
circuit
This figure illustrates the activity distribution at a specific
sample time and for a set of reference devices. The blue
Gaussian curve is the activity distribution without any HT. And
the red Gaussian curve is the distribution through the same set
of circuits which contains the infected AES (with HT). It is
merely an offset which depends on the HT size, placement
and position relative to the probe in case of EM acquisitions.
Using this model, the probability of detecting a HT can be
calculated. Precisely, we can estimate the false positive and
false negative probability of HT detection as a function of HT
size for a set of ICs.
Pfalse negative = Pfalse positive =
1
2
− 1
2
· erf
(
µ
2σ
√
2
)
, (5)
where erf is error function and σ1 ≈ σ2 = σ.
Returning to our specific case study, we apply the false
negative rate equation on the absolute of differences. More
precisely, we calculate the false negative rate on the sum of
the local maxima of the absolute differences Dg j and Dts, j.
Indeed, we found in Fig. 6 that the difference between genuine
and infected AES traces are mainly located at the trace peaks.
Therefore the local maxima are point of interest and HT
detection is logically based on these point. By summing these
local maxima, we can increase the HT detection probability.
The computation of the false negative rate is the following:
• Calculate Dg j and Dts, j.
• Find the local maxima of Dg j and Dts, j.
• Sum the local maxima of each Dg j and Dts, j.
• Compute the false negative rate on the sum of local
maxima.
The false negative rates of HT occupying 0.5%, 1% and 1.7%
of the AES area are respectively 26%, 17% and 5%. We
can notice that the detection probability increases when the
HT size increases. This is logical because the bigger the HT
the more it contributes to the IC activity (hence larger EM
emanations). We can also notice that for a HT 1 of size 0.5%,
there is a high false negative rate of 26% because of process
variations. For a HT 3 of size of 1.7%, the false negative rate
decreases to 5% which is quite acceptable. In the state of the
art, there are some obfuscation techniques used to force an
attacker to increase the size of his HT hence improving the
detection probability using this approach. So the HT can be
detected even with the presence of process variations.
VI. Conclusion and Perspectives
In this paper, we studied the detection of HT implanted
on FPGAs, without changing the placement and routing of
the original circuit. This represents a proof of concept study
for ASIC circuit where HT are added by untrusted chip
manufacturers before the final fabrication of the chip. First
of all, a novel HT detection approach using delay analysis us
presented. This method is based on decreasing gradually the
clock signal to create clock glitches. Then the IC critical paths
delays for several bits are estimated with the faulted outputs
and number of decreased clock steps. The HT detection
relies on the defined delay model for a net. Second, an HT
detection method using EM analysis is also introduced. It
provides a better spatial and temporal resolution than power
measurements. In these two methods, HT can be detected
by comparing directly the delay/EM measurement between
genuine and infected design using AES as target circuit.
Next, we tested HT of different sizes to estimate the detec-
tion probability as a function of its size taking into account
the inter-die process variations. 8 different FPGA of the same
reference (Xilinx LX30) are used to study the impact of inter-
die process variations on this detection probability. We also
introduce the metric to detect HT by exploiting EM techniques.
This metric sums the local maxima of the absolute difference
of the EM captured traces. It predicts the probability of HT
detection with determined false positive and false negative
rates. The results show that, using this metric, there is a
probability greater than 95% with a false negative rate of 5%
to detect a HT larger than 1.7% of the original circuit area.
Further extension of this work can include a more precise
evaluation of impact of process variations on detection proba-
bility using both delay and EM measurements. This precision
can be achieved by conducting the same experiments on n
FPGAs, where n  8.
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Appendix
To evaluate the HT detection using delay and EM analysis,
an AES 128 bits is used as the target circuit. This AES needs
10 rounds for one cipher computation. The proof-of-concept
is done on FPGAs from Xilinx [17].
A. Delay Measurement
Delay measurement platform is composed of:
• Xilinx Spartan 3AN based FPGA board. The test chip’s nominal
clock period is 10 ns, and its core nominal voltage is 1.2 V.
• Xilinx Virtex V based FPGA board, used as an external clock.
B. Electromagnetic Measurement
EM measurement platform is composed of:
• FF324 Virtex 5 experimental board with a ZIF socket that allows
to change the device under test (DUT).
• Xilinx FPGA Virtex 5 (LX30) fabricated in 65 nm technology
node.
• Langer RFU-5-2 probe that captures the global EM activity of
the chip.
• 30 dB Langer EMV power amplifier to amplify EM signal
coming from the probe.
• Agilent 54853A infiniium DSO configured at 5 GS/s.
• Agilent E3631A stabilized power supply for the test board.
